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Crime and Natural Resource Booms: Evidence from
Unconventional Natural Gas Production

By TIMOTHY M. KOMAREK *
The United States has experienced a sudden expansion of natural
gas production due to the combination of hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling. The energy extraction boom will likely have
localized impacts, most notably in areas with substantial shale gas
reserves. This paper exploits a natural experiment in the Marcellus
region to examine one channel of the so-called ‘resource curse,’ the
effect of resource extraction on local crime. The results show that
areas experiencing a natural gas extraction boom suffer a
significant increase in overall violent crimes, while property crimes
remain similar to non-boom areas. Furthermore, the violent crime
increase appears to be driven primarily by increases in aggravated
and sexual assaults.

Keywords: boomtown, crime, resource extraction, Marcellus shale, panel data,
natural experiment

* Komarek: Old Dominion University, 2023 Constant Hall Norfolk, VA 23529 (e-mail:
tkomarek@odu.edu)

In the 2000s the United States began experiencing a boom in natural gas
production. Estimates from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate
production increased by over 25% from 2000 to 2013. The sudden expansion of
natural gas was largely due to new technologies combining horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing1 (a.k.a. fracking). Specifically, advances in fracking
technology have made it profitable to extract natural gas from shale formations2,
which were previously inaccessible. The EIA 2013 Annual Energy Outlook
predicts natural gas production will continue to rise with estimates suggesting
U.S. reserves hold 70 years of natural gas supply. The natural gas boom will
likely have broad impacts on issues ranging from energy security to climate
change. However, the energy boom will also impact local communities, or
‘boomtowns’ where extraction takes place.
There is a large literature examining the effect of resource extraction and
specialization on economic growth and the labor market. First, resource extraction
could create short-run benefits through spillovers in the multiplier process (e.g.
income and jobs). The income multiplier development channel is likely to be
relevant for shale gas production due to the potential financial windfall to
landholders from mineral right leasing (Paredes et al. 2015). While the “resource
curse” literature highlights that some industries and residents could be harmed
over time through the extraction industry bidding up factor prices,3 among other
issues (Corden and Neary 1982, Sachs and Warner 2001, Jacobsen and Parker,
2014). Nonetheless, the previous literature has found little evidence of the socalled “resource curse” in the fracking boom (Weber 2014, Brown 2014).
Media outlets have also begun to draw attention to a darker side of the fracking
1

See Fitzgerald (2013) for a non-technical description of hydraulic fracturing
Maps of unconventional shale reserves are available from the Energy Information
Administration:
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/maps/maps.htm
3
This version of the “resource curse” has been labeled “Dutch disease”
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boom. For example, an article in National Geographic on the Bakken Shale area
of North Dakota highlights binge drinking, prostitution, and violence among other
negative behaviors due to the “man camps” that spring up to house outside
workers (Dobbs 2013). Journalists have also noted increases in drugs and drug
related crimes in the Washington Post (Horwitz 2014), violence against women in
the New York Times (Eligon 2013), as well as fatal accidents and sexually
transmitted infections (Food and Water Watch, 2013). In a revealing exposition
titled “Wildcatting: A Stripper’s Guide to the Modern American Boomtown” an
adult entertainment worker describes her “roughneck” customers and the
transition of Williston, N.D. into a resource extraction boomtown (Shepard 2013).
The author writes:
Williston residents complain that an unsavory element has been drawn
to town, pointing to spikes in violent crime, sexual assault, and drugrelated (often meth) arrests. In March, a man was murdered in the street
in front of the two strip clubs. A brawl in Heartbreakers spilled into the
street. It was possibly spurred along by one of the Heartbreakers
bouncers. A man was shot and killed. The police didn’t arrive for 30
minutes because the on-duty officers were tied up at another (non-lethal)
shooting on the other side of town. The phrase “the Wild West” is
frequently uttered; to many it feels lawless.

The author describes the population growth in the boomtown, which largely
comes from young males earning a high salary with little attachment to the
community. This echoes academic research (e.g. Archbold, 2013, Ruddell, 2011)
suggesting the inability of the local government, including law enforcement, to
respond to rapidly changing local conditions in boomtowns.
The resource curse literature, which often examines resource rich countries,
includes rent seeking, corruption and conflict as channels that perpetuate poor
overall growth prospects (Van der Ploeg 2011). However, the research on the
localized effect of a resource boom on criminal activity in a developed country is

scarce. For example, the criminology literature has utilized qualitative methods to
show increased fear of crime and drunk driving among local residents as a result
resource based booms (Carrignton Pereira 2011, Ruddell et al. 2013). While
Luthra et al. (2007) use pooled time-series analysis for the offshore oil industry in
Louisiana, but do not significant effects on local crime. In contrast, Haggerty et
al. (2014) find that specialization in oil and gas extraction in the 1970s negatively
effected crime rates (property and violent) and education rates long-term. This
work quantifies the negative effects of the resource bust on crime and quality of
life indicators.
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of unconventional4
(fracking) natural gas extraction, and more generally resource booms, on crime in
a community. Social costs associated with resource extraction are an important,
yet less understood component of the resource curse. I use county level data from
2004 - 2012 on seven FBI Index I offenses and unconventional natural gas wells
drilled. My identification strategy exploits a natural experiment resulting from
differing policies related to fracking in the Marcellus region. In particular, the
State of New York until recently imposed a moratorium on using fracking
techniques (Rabe and Borick 2013). Conversely, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania permitted use of fracking technology over the sample time period.
The natural experiment provides an arguably exogenous variation in policy
regimes, because the New York moratorium was largely due to environmental
concerns, and not the fear of increased criminal activity.5 My results show that
natural gas boom counties (measured by 75 or more unconventional wells drilled
4

"An unconventional gas well is a well that is drilled into an unconventional formation, which is
defined as a geologic shale formation below the base of the Elk Sandstone or its geologic
equivalent where natural gas generally cannot be produced except by horizontal or vertical well
bores stimulated by hydraulic fracturing." (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
SPUD Data Report)
5
For example, the fracking opposition group “New Yorkers Against Fracking” focuses on ground
water contamination issues. More information found at: http://nyagainstfracking.org

in a year) experience a more than 30% increase in violent crimes compared to
control counties. In contrast, property crimes in boom counties were statistically
insignificant in my preferred specification. Falsification tests provide no evidence
that the positive relationship between fracking and crime is due to divergent preexisting trends, and therefore support a causal interpretation. I use data from the
criminology literature to estimate the total victimization cost of $11.7 million per
boom county each year.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I measure the
contemporaneous effect of natural resource extraction on criminal activity.
Ideally, one would want to examine the effect of the influx of extraction workers
on crime. However, labor market data is unreliable due to the transient nature of
many extraction workers and censored industry classification information at the
county level. Therefore, I consider boom areas based on the number of
unconventional wells drilled. Inevitably humans commit and are victims of
crimes, nonetheless unconventional wells drilled act as a proxy for economic
activity from resource extraction. According to Jacquet (2009), the drilling phase
is the most labor-intensive part of natural gas extraction. Thus, the time horizon I
am measuring differs from Haggerty et al. (2014), which considers crime
resulting from industry specialization and an energy extraction bust. Second, I
discuss the various theoretical links from the economics and criminology
literature on resource extraction and crime. Third, I demonstrate that my results
are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls, such as area and time fixed
effects, demographics and population change. Furthermore, I show that the results
are robust to alternative specifications, samples and estimation techniques as well
as provide an estimate of victimization costs from the criminology literature.

II. Resource Booms and Crime
A. Economic Impact of the Natural Gas Boom
Corden and Neary (1982) and Jacobsen and Parker (2014) highlight the
broader economic implications of a resource extraction boom and bust. During a
resource boom an unanticipated labor demand shock is expected to increase
wages for extraction workers as well as wages in related industries to attract
workers6. The ability of the local labor market to respond to the demand shock
depends on the specialized needs in the resource extraction industry and the skills
of local residents. Research on the coal boom in the 1970s suggests that local
residents filled many low-skilled jobs (Black et al. 2005a, Black et al. 2005b). On
the other hand, evidence is limited on the labor market supply response during the
fracking boom. Several studies show that employment and population increased
over the course of the fracking energy boom (Weber 2012, Weber 2014, Brown
2014). However, Ruddel et al. (2014) and White (2012) highlight to the transient
nature of many extraction workers. The authors refer to them as drive-in and
drive-out or fly-in and fly-out employees that live in temporary housing or “man
camps” when working. The unavailability of pertinent migration data and the
transient nature of many workers make estimating the in-migration response to
the labor demand shock challenging.
Economic theory suggests that during the resource extraction boom total wages
will be bid up. However, in the fracking boom landowners benefit through leasing
their mineral rights to the extraction companies. The royalty payments received,
often by local residents, can be lump sum, persist over the course of the

6

Wages being bid up in the non-extraction traded sector over time can result in contraction in the

traded sectors (manufacturing, construction, etc.).

production period, among other possibilities (Weidner et al., 2009). Thus, there is
an income shock to a community due to extraction that is separate from the labor
market shock.
B. Theoretical Connections Between Resource Booms and Crime
The economic theory of crime is largely attributed to the work of Gary Becker
(1968). Becker’s rational choice theory posits that economic agents weigh costs
and benefits in deciding whether to engage in criminal activity or not. For
example, this literature highlights benefits from criminal activity in areas with
income shocks and high economic inequality. Alternatively, the costs to
committing a crime would include the probability of apprehension and
imprisonment and the opportunity cost legitimate employment, among other
costs. Deller and Deller (2010) include Becker’s rational choice model along with
theories from criminology and sociology to examine crime in rural communities.
Following Grinols and Mustard (2006) I draw upon relevant theories to examine
several of the competing theoretical predictions of a resource boom on local
crime.
Reductions in crime
Wage and income effect: Economic theory predicts an increase in wages for
low-skilled extraction workers and other related industries. Furthermore, if the
local labor supply is not perfectly elastic non-traded local wages would also be
expected to rise. The natural gas fracking boom also creates an increase in local
incomes due royalty payments to landholders. Thus, the higher wages and
incomes increase the opportunity cost of apprehension, which economic theory
predicts to lower crime rates. Gould et al. (2002) find that increased wages and
employment for low-skilled workers reduced crime.

Development effect: Increased fracking activity can encourage local economic
development in related industries. For example, Allcott and Keniston (2014) find
that manufacturing can actually grow in resource boom communities as firms
supply inputs to the extraction sector. The development channel also suggests
reduced crime from beneficial labor market spillovers to the non-traded sector.
Increases in crime
Development effect: The fracking related economic development channel
could also increase criminal activity. First, disamenities associated with fracking,
such as pollution and heavy truck traffic, may discourage new firms and residents
from locating in a community. Second, some service industries such bars,
prostitution, drugs, etc. may be drawn to boomtowns. These industries service
extraction workers, and can become congregation points for criminal activity.
Increased payoff to crime: Rational choice theory suggests that as wages and
income in a community increase so does the benefits to committing a crime. The
increased payoff to crime would be exacerbated if gains from the fracking boom
were unequally distributed. For instance, extraction workers and large landowners
may disproportionately benefit from the fracking boom compared to low-skilled
residents. Economic literature has suggested that having lower-income people
near high-income people provides a rational incentive to commit crime (Deller
and Deller 2010). Furthermore, anomie or strain theory notes that inequality can
create an envy effect and impact violent crimes (Kelly 2000).
Probability of apprehension: The increase in population and economic
activity can put a strain on the local infrastructure. Kowalski and Zajac (2012)
note that phone calls to police increased by over 33% in Pennsylvania energy
producing counties between 2006 and 2010. With law enforcement stretched thin
and local governments unable to quickly adjust to the rapidly changing
environment it is likely that the threat of arrest and prosecution has declined

in boomtowns.
Fracking induced population changes: The population growth from resource
booms comes primarily from young, male extraction workers and support
industries (Ruddell et al. 2014). These demographic changes create an imbalance
in the population sex-ratio, and encourage specific types of crimes, in this case
potentially crimes against women. While population growth alone can fuel crime,
an influx of young males can further perpetuate the problem. In particular, young
males participate in a disproportionate amount of violent and property crimes.
Furthermore, Deller and Deller (2010) note that when the newcomers enter a
community social capital deteriorates and crime tends to increase.
The theories described above suggest that there are competing effects that
could result in an increase or decrease in overall crime rates. However, it is also
possible that these mechanisms could cause different impacts across types of
crimes. In particular, one would expect that the income and beneficial
development effects would primarily affect property crimes. Thus, for property
crimes to increase the increased payoff to crimes would have to out weigh the
opportunity cost of getting caught. This could be the case if the benefits from the
fracking boom are disproportionately concentrated among extraction workers and
landowners, while local residents do not benefit or are economically worse off.
This scenario seems unlikely, especially during the boom phase. Thus, I expect
property crimes to not differ between boom and non-boom counties.
The wage and income as well as development effects would also be expected to
influence violent crimes. In the same channel as property crimes, being
apprehended for committing a violent crime would affect ones earning potential,
likely decreasing violent crimes. Conversely, extraction workers often earn high
wages in remote areas. The development effect from industries servicing workers
may perpetuate violent crimes. For example, bars and strip clubs may serve as
gathering places, leading to alcohol-induced crimes. While the sex ratio

imbalance may lead to a higher incident of conflicts with local residents and
increase sexual assaults. Consequently, I expect an increase in aggravated and
sexual assaults in boomtowns.
III. Data and Sample Description
To examine the effect of activities related to the natural gas boom on local crime I
use county level data from New York and Pennsylvania. Data on crime are from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report for seven FBI
Index I offenses7. The offenses include violent crime (aggravated assault, rape,
robbery, and murder) as well as property crimes (larceny, burglary, and auto
theft). I obtained data on the number of unconventional natural gas wells drilled
by county from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. I use
the U.S. Census Bureau’s demographic data on gender, race and age groups to
calculate their share in each county and the population density. The employment
and unemployment data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Local Area
Unemployment Statistics data. Finally, I use county-level income data from
Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal Income (BEA LAPI)
database. The BEA revised their income statistics to include royalty income from
mineral extraction8, among other sources of income. Thus, the income data
provide a more accurate portrayal of the income shock in a community from
fracking than wages or salary data.

7

For more information see: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr
For more information on the BEA’s Local Area Personal Income revision and methodology
see:www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/12%20December/1213_lapi-text.pdfand
www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2011.pdf

8

A. Sample Selection
The initial sample includes counties in Pennsylvania and New York from 2004
through 2012. The states were chosen because they both share the Marcellus shale
region, yet differ in natural gas extraction policy. New York implemented a
moratorium on fracking, while the Pennsylvania allowed early adoption of
fracking technology (Rabe and Borick 2013). Figure 1 shows the Utica and
Marcellus shale formations shared by the two states. The differing policies in the
region provide a natural experiment to analyze the effect to natural gas production
on crime.
The policies in New York and Pennsylvania have led to dramatically different
levels of natural gas production. Figure 2 displays the natural gas production in
both states from 2004 to 2012. Prior to 2007, natural gas production growth in
each state was relatively stagnant. Pennsylvania produced an average of 179
million mcf

9

and New York averaged 52 million mcf. However, by 2012 the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s natural gas production increased to 1,298
million mcf, a 625% increase. In contrast, New York’s natural gas production
remained flat over the sample time frame. The increased production is largely
attributed to the adoption of fracking technology used in the Marcellus Shale.
Furthermore, the production of natural gas closely matches unconventional
natural gas wells, which produce natural gas from shale formations, drilled in
Pennsylvania. Thus, the sample is restricted to only include counties that have
some coverage in the Marcellus shale region shown in Figure 1. This provides an
objective measure of their extractive potential in the natural experiment research
design.

9

mcf stands for 1,000s of cubic feet.

B. Unconventional Well Data and Determining Boom Counties
I obtained county level data on unconventional natural gas wells from the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. The well data comprises
bore holes drilled in unconventional shale formation, which typically t produce
natural gas using hydraulic fracturing techniques. I focus on the number of wells
being drilled, rather than production amounts for several reasons. First, natural
gas production data can be highly variable from year to year due to measurement
and reporting challenges. Thus, the most convincing studies using production data
look at longer-run effects, for example over a decade (Weber 2014, Brown 2014).
Second, economic activity associated with drilling, such as increases in labor, are
often associated with boomtowns. Jaquette (2009) suggests that the majority of
the extraction related jobs come from well development and construction, while
relatively few workers are involved in production and reclamation. Third, natural
gas production often continues years, or even decades, after the well is initially
drilled. Thus, production data can be a misleading measure of economic activity
related to the fracking boom.
I use the number of unconventional wells to determine the counties that
experience an unanticipated labor demand shock from fracking. Figure 3 displays
the distribution of new unconventional wells drilled conditional on a county
having at least one well over the sample period. Over 80% of county-years have
under 75 new unconventional wells drilled. This comes both from counties with
few total wells, as well as the initial ‘test’ drilling period for boom counties. I
define a boom county as a county with over 75 new unconventional wells in a
year. This allows for both temporal and geographic variation in the fracking
boom. Boom counties are grouped together in the southwest corner of
Pennsylvania and in northern the northern portion of the Commonwealth near the
New York border.

Using a boom county indicator, rather than the number of wells drilled, is a
subjective measure of fracking activity. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the
literature on local impacts of resource booms (Black et al. 2005, Weber 2012,
Jacobsen and Parker 2014). I also show in section 5.2 that the general results are
robust to different measures of the boom county along with using the number of
unconventional wells as a continuous variable.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for boom and non-boom counties in the
Marcellus region from 2004 through 2012. The boom county sample includes 63
county-years while the non-boom region comprises 873 county-years. The pvalue in Table 1 tests for difference in the means of boom and non-boom
counties, where the null hypothesis is that they are not different. Boom counties
had on average 64.7 unconventional wells compared to 1.6 for non-boom
counties. The boom and non-boom counties had similar demographic profiles
during the sample period. Boom and non-boom counties had age, population
density, unemployment, employment, population and income difference in means
that were not statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The employment
change in boom counties was statistically different than non-boom counties at the
1% level, while population growth was statistically insignificant. This is
consistent with local job creation associated with fracking, but disamenities from
drilling reducing population growth relative to non-boom counties.
IV. Empirical Methods and Estimation
My empirical strategy uses annual panel data from 2004-2012 to estimate the
effect of unconventional natural gas wells on crime. The empirical model uses
variation in both the timing of fracking in a county and the moratorium on
fracking natural gas in the State of New York over the sample time frame. Thus, I
exploit the natural experiment in the Marcellus shale region. Counties in

Pennsylvania can receive the “treatment” of hight fracking activity, while similar
counties in New York can only be “controls” due to the policy. The base model
specification uses all counties in the Marcellus shale region. I experiment later
with alternative samples, specifications and estimation techniques and the results
prove robust. The basic analysis begins with the following regression model:
(1)

𝑌!" = 𝛽! 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝛽! 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝑋!" Θ + 𝛼! + 𝛾! + 𝜀!"

where Yct is a measure crime in county c at time t. Crime is the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformed number of reported crimes per 100,000 residents. The inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation10 allows for the same interpretation as a log
transformation11 (Burbidge, et al. 1988). However, it is defined at zero, and thus,
does not drop county-years with zero crimes. The variable HighFrackingct is a
indicator variable equal to 1 if county c year t had over 75 unconventional natural
gas wells and 0 otherwise. Similarly, LowFrackingct is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if county c year t has between 1 and 75 unconventional wells and 0
otherwise. The estimated parameters β1 and β2 can then be interpreted as the
percent change in crime attributable to high and low fracking activity in a county
respectively.
The vector 𝑋!" contains a wide range of demographic and labor market control
variables listed in Table 1. By using panel data I am able to control for several
types of unobserved heterogeneity. 𝛼! is a county fixed effect that controls for
observable and unobservable differences across counties that are constant over
time. The time fixed effect 𝛾! controls for common shocks that affect in all

10

The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is expressed as ln  (𝑟 + 𝑟 ! + 1), where r is the
variable to be transformed.
11
The results are robust to using the log transformation and adding 1 to each observation i.e.
log(Yct + 1).

counties over time. Furthermore, the inclusion of county and time fixed effects is
crucial to proper identification given my research design. Finally, 𝜀!" is a random
disturbance term. To estimate the model in equation 1, I use unweighted ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions. To correct for serial correlation I cluster the
standard errors by county following Arellano (1987).
The criminology literature has suggested that crime rates are closely tied to
local labor market conditions (Gould et al. 2002, Levitt, 2001). Therefore, I
include pertinent labor market variables like the unemployment rate, income per
capita along with the employment level and employment growth. Previous studies
on the effect of casinos on crime (Grinols and Mustard 2006) and drunk driving
(Cotti and Walker 2010) have also highlighted the importance of controlling for
population-induced effects. Thus, I add controls for various demographic groups,
the level of population and population growth from the U.S. Census.
Unfortunately, a weakness in the Census data is its inability to capture the
transient nature of the natural gas and oil labor market.
V. Results
A. Basic Results
I begin examining the effect of fracking activity on crime by estimating equation
1. I use a balanced sample, containing high fracking, low fracking and control
counties within the Marcellus Shale region for New York and Pennsylvania.
Table 2 shows estimates for all violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and
aggravated assault) as well as all property crimes (burglary, larceny, and auto
theft). The results in Table 3 decompose crimes into each of the seven FBI Index I
offenses. In each case the dependent variable is the hyperbolic sine transformation
of crime rates for 100,000 residents. Thus, the estimates can be interpreted as
elasticities. The second and fourth columns in Table 2 include the control

variables listed in Table 1. Finally, the estimates in both Table 2 and Table 3
include county and year fixed effects as well as control variables. F-statistics for
the joint significance of the year and county fixed effects are statistically
significant in all models.
The results in Table 2 show a positive effect of fracking activity on violent
crime. For example, the first column in Table 2 suggests that a high fracking
county experiences an increase in violent crimes of approximately 35%,
compared to counties without any fracking. Similarly, low fracking counties also
experience a positive and statistically significant increase in violent crime of 11%.
This relationship also holds when I include a several pertinent control variables
common in the crime literature (Levitt 2001, Gould et al. 2002). The results also
show that the effect of fracking is smaller for property crimes. Without including
control variable (column 3), the effect of fracking is a less than 10% increase on
property crimes for high intensity areas. While the effect on property crimes is
statistically insignificant at the 10% level when including control variables.
The results in Table 3 examine each of the FBI Index I offenses individually.
Panel A shows violent crimes, while Panel B examines property crimes. In
general, Table 3 suggests that the violent crime increase (shown in Table 2) is
primarily driven by increases in rape and aggravated assault. Both rapes and
aggravated assaults increase by over 30% in high fracking activity counties.
Furthermore, murder and robbery are statistically insignificant at the 10% level.
The r-squared suggests that the model examining variation in murders is under
0.4, while the model for aggravated assault is 0.77. Thus, even including fixed
effects and control variables the model explains less than 40% of the variation in
murders. Finally, the high fracking variable is statistically insignificant for all
three types of property crimes at the 10% level.

B. Falsification Tests
The natural experiment provides an arguably exogenous variation in policy
regimes between fracking counties in Pennsylvania and non-fracking counties in
New York. Furthermore, the difference-in-differences strategy, shown in equation
1, also hinges on the pre-existing trends between fracking and non-fracking areas
not differing. If for example, fracking boom counties were experiencing faster
growth in criminal activity relative to non-fracking counties in the Marcellus
region, this could lead to estimating a positive spurious relationship.
I examine whether the positive association between the fracking boom and
crime discussed in section 5.1 is due to differential pre-exisiting trends by
estimating falsification tests. I do this by estimating equation (1) with the fracking
boom indicator variables shifted 3 or 4 years ahead of the actual boom. Thus,
conditioning on time and county fixed effects, contemporaneous fracking
indicators should predict a crime and fracking relationship, if there is one, while
leads prior to the boom should not. Table 4 shows the results of the falsification
tests. Each model includes all of the control variables as well as county and time
fixed effects. The high and low fracking indicator variables are not statistically
significant at the 10% level for property and violent crimes. Thus, the falsification
tests do not provide evidence of a spurious, positive result due to pre-exisiting
trends.
C. Robustness Checks
While I believe that my identification strategy, functional form choices, etc. are
reasonable, nonetheless, I recognize that thoughtful researchers could choose
alternative approaches. Thus, I show several alternative estimates in Table 5 to
show that my results are robust to alternative strategies. I focus on evaluating total
violent and property crimes. Each set of results use county and year fixed effects

and the full range of control variables. The comparable basic results can be found
in Table 2. The basic results suggest a 30% increase in violent crimes and no
statistically significant effect in property crimes.
The first set of robustness checks considers alternative specifications for both
the dependent and independent variable of interest. Model 1 displays estimate
where the dependent variable is the level of crime, instead of the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of the crime rate. Using the level of crime rate
suggests that high fracking activity increases violent crimes by 61 per 100,000
residents. While similar to the basic model, high fracking activity has a
statistically insignificant effect on property crime rates. Next, I interact the high
fracking and low fracking activity dummy variables with the demeaned county
population. This strategy was used by Cotti and Walker (2010) to test for
population induced impacts on drunk driving from casino openings. The
coefficient can be interpreted as the percent increase in crime rate from high (or
low) fracking activity in a county with average population, relative to the control
group of counties without any fracking taking place. The results on the high and
low fracking variables in model 2 are similar to the basic model results. Further,
the interaction terms show a statistically insignificant population induced effect
from fracking activity. Finally, models 3 – 5 use alternative indicators of the
fracking boom. Model 3 uses the number of unconventional wells similar to the
specification employed by Paredes et al. (2015). It suggests that every additional
unconventional well is associated with a 0.1% increase in violent crimes. The
other boom county indicators in models 4 and 5 show an approximately 22%
increase in violent crimes from fracking.
Next, I examine an alternative sample of counties. Paredes et al. (2015) argues
that parts of New York still experience economic activity associated with fracking
despite its moratorium on the practice. For example, a major railroad line travels
along the Pennsylvania and New York border and several extraction companies

have located regional headquarters on the New York side of the border. In the
treatment and control paradigm, this would suggest that counties in Upstate New
York should also be considered treated counties. I would expect this to downward
bias my results reported in Table 2. Model 6 shows results eliminating the New
York border counties. The high fracking indicator variable remains statistically
significant at the 1% level and high fracking activity is associated with a 33%
increase in violent crimes.
The final set of robustness checks examines alternative estimation techniques.
The basic results from section 5.1 use unweighted OLS regressions with standard
errors cluster by county. It could be argued that since crime rates are highly
variable, and individual crimes are aggregated to the county that it could be
appropriate to use weighted least squares. However, Solon et al. (2013) suggest
using caution and relying on diagnostics when using weighted estimation to
correct for heteoskedasticity or identify average partial effects in the presence of
unmodeled heterogeneity. Model 7 displays results for weighting equation 1 by
county-year population. The estimated coefficients imply that high fracking
activity causes a 20% increase in violent crimes compared to the control group,
while low fracking increases violent crimes by 5%. The estimates weighting by
county-year population are smaller than the unweighted results, yet still
statistically significant for violent crimes. The fixed effects Poisson estimation
technique is another potential estimation strategy that accounts for the countnature of the crime data. The fixed effects Poisson estimation in Model 8 yields
similar results as the base models.
VI. Estimates of Victimization Costs of Fracking
Policy makers and natural gas proponents often cite the benefits in terms of jobs
and income that are created in a community. However, the welfare costs of

victims of crimes, among other costs, should also be considered to make optimal
policy decisions. The results presented in section 5 suggest that the fracking boom
in the Marcellus region attributed to an increase in violent crimes, while property
crimes remained unchanged. I use published estimates of the victimization costs
for FBI Index I crimes to infer an aggregate community level crime cost to
fracking activity.
Table 6 presents victimization costs from McCollister et al. (2010). The costs
for each criminal category include measures of tangible costs (e.g. medical
expenses, property damage, etc.) and intangible costs (e.g. elevated fear, pain and
suffering, etc.). McCollister et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive methodology
to estimating the cost of crimes to society and use the most current available data
different crimes in 2008 dollars. The estimated victimization costs range from
almost $9 million for murder to just over $3,500 for larceny.
My estimates suggest that violent crimes increased in a county by
approximately 35% from fracking, while property crimes were statistically
insignificant at the 10% level. On average, the violent crime increase in boom
counties was 61 per 100,000 residents. The violent crime increase is primarily
attributed to increases in aggravated assaults (40 per 100,000 residents) and
sexual assaults (20 per 100,000 residents). I focus on these two crime metrics
because of their statistical significance in the results, and to provide a lower
bound for the aggregate county level victimization. The summary statistics in
table show that the average population in boom counties was approximately
100,000 residents over the sample timeframe. Thus, the estimates can be thought
of the amount of additional crimes in the average county per year. Using the
estimated victimization costs in table 6 suggests that the county cost of aggravated

assaults is approximates $4.8 million and sexual assaults is $4.2 million per
year12.
VII. Conclusion
In the 2000s the U.S. experienced a boom in natural gas production from the
advent of fracking technology. The localized effects of extraction have been
concentrated in areas with shale plays. I examine one negative consequence of
resource extraction in the Marcellus shale region, increased crime. To estimate the
effect of the fracking boom on crime I exploit a natural experiment in policy
regimes between Pennsylvania and New York and use panel data estimation
techniques. The results show that areas experiencing a natural gas extraction
boom suffer increase in overall violent crimes, while property crimes remain
similar to non-boom areas. I examine FBI Index I offenses and show that the
increase in violent crimes appears to be driven by increases in aggravated assaults
and rapes. Victimization costs from the criminology literature suggest that
fracking is associated with a cost of $9 million per boom county each year.
I show that the results are robust to a wide array of control variables that
include demographic categories, population density, and labor market variables.
In particular, I include population growth and employment growth variables to
control for changes in the size of the population, which has been linked to crime
rates in previous studies. I also show that the results are robust to alternative
specifications of the dependent variable and explanatory variable of interest, an
indicator for a county experiencing a resource extraction shock. Furthermore, I
show my estimates are robust to alternative samples (eliminating New York
border counties) and estimation methods, such as weighting techniques and fixed

12

E.g. 40 additional aggravated assaults per year * $240,776 victimization costs = $9,631,040
per boom county per year.

effects Poisson model. Nonetheless, one should take caution in extrapolating these
results to other parts of the country experiencing the energy boom.
I provide several theoretical explanations from economics, crime and sociology
for changes in local crime rates. Unfortunately, pertinent data on short-term labor
migration of extraction workers is either unreliable or not available. One
interpretation of the results suggests that the influx of temporary extraction
workers creates a magnate for criminality. Thus, regions can experience a
negative consequence of the so-called ‘resource curse’ during the natural resource
boom. The results eliminating New York border counties suggest that crime is not
just being relocated within the region. The results suggest that policy makers
should include increased crime as a potential cost to unconventional natural gas
extraction and make appropriate investments in public services, such as public
safety.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS COMPARING BOOM AND NON-BOOM COUNTIES (2004-2012)
Boom Counties

Non-Boom Counties

	
  
	
  	
  	
  

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

P-value

Violent Crime Rate

146.1

50.1

216.5

110.5

0.000

Property Crime Rate

1,566.6

399.5

1,914.4

575.0

0.000

81.2

32.6

81.6

59.6

0.959

Larceny Rate

1,112.40

340.2

1,395.8

457.4

0.000

Burglary Rate

372.9

100.9

437

171.6

0.004

Aggravated Assault Rate

91.0

38.7

145

75.7

0.000

Robbery Rate

27.5

20.8

42.2

48.1

0.017

Rape Rate

25.4

13.3

27.2

30.6

0.660

Murder Rate

2.1

2.2

2.2

2.4

0.629

Dependent Variables

Auto Theft Rate

Control Variables
Unconventional Wells

64.7

82.8

1.4

6.2

0.000

% Male

0.495

0.010

0.497

0.021

0.415

% White

0.963

0.018

0.93

0.053

0.000

% Black

0.02

0.016

0.042

0.04

0.000

% Age 0-9

0.111

0.006

0.112

0.013

0.779

% Age 10-19

0.135

0.007

0.139

0.013

0.029

% Age 20-29

0.114

0.014

0.123

0.028

0.021

% Age 30-39

0.114

0.01

0.116

0.011

0.274

% Age 40-49

0.149

0.01

0.148

0.012

0.602

Population Density

110.6

81.0

222.0

283.0

0.002

Unemployment Rate
Income per capita
($1,000s)
Employment

0.167

0.192

0.167

0.183

0.995

27.0

4.3

27.4

4.2

0.510

47,949.8

32,774.5

72,485.7

96,261.8

0.044

% Change in Employment
Population
% Change in Population

0.012

0.025

-0.001

0.022

0.000

98,919.5

66,217.4

152,808.3

197,394.9

0.031

0.001

0.005

0.001

0.009

0.649

Notes: Crime rates in annual incidents per 100,000 population. Monetary amounts in year 2000
dollars. Boom county sample size is 63 and non-boom county sample size equals 873. The pvalue tests for difference in the means of boom and non-boom counties. The null hypothesis is
that they are not different.

	
  	
  
	
  

TABLE 2: THE EFFECT OF FRACKING ON VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME (2004-2012)

VARIABLES
High Fracking
Low Fracking

(1)

(2)

Violent Crime

Violent Crime

(3)
Property
Crime

(4)
Property
Crime

0.349***

0.351***

0.0948*

0.0813

(0.0817)

(0.0921)

(0.0551)

(0.0581)

0.115**

0.109**

-0.0171

-0.0135

(0.0503)

(0.0534)

(0.0255)

(0.0269)

Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

County FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

936

936

936

936

R-squared
0.815
0.820
0.847
0.854
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes per
100,000 residents

TABLE 3: THE EFFECT OF FRACKING ON FBI INDEX I OFFENSES (2004-2012)
Panel A: Violent Crimes

Murder

High Fracking

-0.0719

Rape
0.323**

Robbery

Aggravated
Assault

-0.249

0.344***

(0.269)

(0.128)

(0.282)

(0.161)

-0.242*

-0.0278

-0.142

0.128**

(0.128)

(0.128)

(0.117)

(0.0644)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

County FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Low Fracking

Observations

936

936

936

936

R-squared

0.396

0.404

0.805

0.775

Panel B: Property Crimes

Burglary

Larceny

Auto Theft

High Fracking
Low Fracking

0.0875

0.0809

-0.192

(0.0921)

(0.0635)

(0.194)

-0.0296

-0.00776

-0.187*

(0.0284)

(0.0319)

(0.103)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

County FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

936

936

936

R-squared

0.790

0.869

0.791

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes
per 100,000 residents

TABLE 4: FALSIFICATION TESTS OF FRACKING BOOM ON VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME
Analysis Type
# of Years Boom Date Shifted

VARIABLES
High Fracking

Fracking Boom Date Falsification Test
3 years ahead

4 years ahead

3 years ahead

4 years ahead

(1)

(2)

Violent Crime

Violent Crime

(3)
Property
Crime

(4)
Property
Crime

0.0623

-0.0492

0.0823

0.00720

(0.106)

(0.100)

(0.0565)

(0.0433)

-0.0507

-0.0679

0.0290

-0.00420

(0.0503)

(0.0751)

(0.0246)

(0.0150)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

County FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

728

624

728

624

Low Fracking

R-squared
0.819
0.844
0.937
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of crimes per
100,000 residents
These results are from the difference-in-difference specification that moves the fracking boom
date ahead as a falsification test.

0.943

TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF BASIC RESULTS
Model
Alternative Specification
1. Dependent variable in levels
(Crimes per 100,000 population)

Variable
High Fracking
Low Fracking

2. Fracking indicators interacted with
de-meaned population. For example
High Fracking*Population = High
Fracking* [Log(population)log(mean population)]

High Fracking
Low Fracking
High Fracking*Population
Low Fracking*Population

3. Explanatory variable: # of wells

4. Explanatory variable: fracking
indicator variable cutoff at 125
wells

5. Explanatory variable: fracking
indicator variable cutoff at 25 wells

# of wells

Wells>125
0<Wells<125

Wells>25
0<Wells<25

Alternative Sample
6. Eliminating NY Border Counties

High Fracking
Low Fracking

Alternative Estimation Method
7. Weighted by county-year
population

High Fracking

Low Fracking

Violent
Crime

Property
Crime

61.04***

109.9

(19.67)

(89.55)

26.80**

-25.77

(13.16)

(41.77)

0.358***

0.0778

(0.0896)

(0.0622)

0.110**

-0.0154

(0.0523)

(0.0277)

-4.137

3.009

(6.362)

(6.018)

-1.485

-2.133

(4.465)

(1.515)

0.00133***

0.000373

(0.000480)

(0.0002)

0.222***

0.0315

(0.0789)

(0.0658)

0.109**

-0.0127

(0.0536)

(0.0262)

0.203**

0.0183

(0.0967)

(0.0516)

0.112**

-0.0119

(0.0530)

(0.0273)

0.331***

0.0652

(0.0917)

(0.0582)

0.0990*

-0.0213

(0.0533)

(0.0268)

0.202**

0.0468

(0.0847)

(0.0560)

0.0544**
(0.0269)

-0.0251
(0.0211)

TABLE 5 CONTINUED
8. Fixed Effects Poisson

High Fracking

0.364***
(0.0270)

Low Fracking

0.139***
(0.0109)

Notes: All models include county and year fixed effects and control variables

0.063***
(0.0084)
-0.017***
(0.0037)

TABLE 6: PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED VICTIMIZATION COSTS
Violent Crimes
Rape/Sexual Assault

$240,776

Murder

$8,982,907

Aggravated Assault

$107,020

Robbery

$42,310

Property Crimes
Burglary

$6,462

Larceny

$3,532

Motor Vehicle Theft
$10,772
McCollister, K.E., M.T. French, and H. Fang. 2010. “The cost of
crime to society: New crime-specific estimates for policy and program
evaluation” Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 108, pg 89-109.

